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Abstract 
This article considers a dispute between the European Union and Council of Europe 
regarding their respective roles in the broadcasting field, so as to explain and assess 
its relevance for the development at the international level of media law and policy.  
The dispute is a long-running one and dates back to the adoption of the first EEC 
Directive and Council Convention on this subject in 1989. It is argued that the 
expansion of the scope of EU broadcasting law and the consolidation of the European 
Commission’s role in external affairs left little room for the Council to continue to 
exercise influence over the regulation of the electronic media in the way it has done 
for some time. The exact nature of the dispute between the institutions, and the 
response of a vocal member state, is ascertained through consideration of published 
minutes and internal correspondence, set in the context of doctrinal and political 
developments. The article concludes with analysis of possible future actions for the 
Council. 
 
Keywords 
broadcasting, European Union, Council of Europe, Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive, external relations, internal market 
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Death of a Convention: competition between the Council of Europe and 
European Union in the regulation of broadcasting 
 
Daithí Mac Síthigh, University of Edinburgh 
 
1. Introduction§ 
 
As a result of a legal dispute between the Council of Europe and the 
European Commission [‘the Commission’], a proposed revision of the 
Council’s principal instrument on broadcasting, the European Convention on 
Transfrontier Television1 [‘the Convention], has not been adopted. The 
Commission itself proposed a revision of European Union (EU) broadcasting 
law in 2005, which was adopted in 2007 as the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive2 [‘the Directive’]. The revision of the Directive prompted the Council 
to put forward its own proposals, as the Convention and Directive have 
operated in parallel since 1989.  
 
This article is an exploration of (a) the reasons why, over time, the EU and the 
Council of Europe have disagreed over their respective roles relating to the 
regulation of broadcasting, and (b) the implications of the possible 'death' of 
the Convention on the Council’s future role in developing media law and 
policy. It is based on a comprehensive review of Council of Europe 
documents on the revision process, supported by consideration of the 
development of the external powers of the European Union and reference to 
internal discussions within the UK government. The consequences of the 
outcome for the affected parties are considered.  
 
The EU of today is different to the European Economic Community [‘EEC’] of 
the 1980s in many ways. Its external powers have been clarified in ECJ 
decisions (and codified through the Lisbon Treaty) and its role in broadcasting 
has become well settled. The relationship between the Council and the EU is 
also in transition, as the EU ‘(moves) into areas already covered by the 
Council’.3 Nonetheless, the decisions taken regarding the Convention should 
not pass without comment. As compared with the debate of the 1980s 
discussed in section 2 (below), where the case for the Council and EEC 
involvement in the field was made at summit-level meetings and in a thorough 
                                       
§
 The author thanks academic colleagues for constructive comments on drafts of this article, 
particularly Claudina Richards (East Anglia), Dr. Ewa Komorek (Trinity College Dublin), 
Stephanie Berry (Sussex), Prof. Lorna Woods (City), Prof. Steve Peers (Essex) and Dr. 
Rachael Craufurd Smith (Edinburgh), and acknowledges a very helpful exchange with Ross 
Biggam of the Association of Commercial Television in Europe. Presented as a paper at the 
Society of Legal Scholars (2011) and the Institute for the Study of European Laws (2012). 
1
 European Treaty Series [‘ETS’] 132 (1989). 
2
 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on 
the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in 
Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services [2010] OJ L263/15. 
3
 Florence Benoit-Rohmer and Heinrich Klebes, Council of Europe law: towards a pan-
European legal area (Council of Europe Publishing 2005) 128. Issues here include not just 
the geographical reach of the Union but also the accession of the Union to the ECHR and the 
sidelining of the ‘pillars’ found in earlier Treaties. 
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fashion in law journals,4 there has been virtually no attention paid to the 
current realignment. What Chalaby described as ‘two European institutions 
compet(ing) for the opportunity to provide the legal framework for satellite 
television’5 can also be read as a positive approach where the more powerful 
EU is influenced by the wider but less powerful Council – a process which I 
refer to as beneficial deliberative competition.  
 
The adoption of the original instruments in 1989 is the subject of section 2. 
Section 3 explains how, in the period 2005-2011, the Directive was 
successfully revised but the Convention was not, mapping out the positions of 
key interested parties and the nature of the disputes between them. Section 4 
considers how the Union found itself in such a strong legal position, compares 
the position of broadcasting with other areas of potential dispute between the 
Union and Council, and applies a framework for understanding 
interinstitutional relations developed by Malte Brosig. In section 5, the 
response of the United Kingdom to the revision of the Convention is 
considered, making use of documents obtained by the author under the 
Freedom of Information Act; this allows the reader to understand the dispute 
as one which had tactical and substantive aspects as well as being about 
competences. Finally, section 6 considers the future role of the Council of 
Europe, particularly the proposal for a separate Council instrument on other 
areas of media law and policy. 
 
2. European institutions and media law 
 
The Council of Europe’s role in relation to the media has evolved over a long 
period.6 It considered issues of copyright and of culture in its earlier years, as 
well as specific issues of media policy, such as the right of reply (1974) and 
journalistic freedom (1975). By 1976 a committee of experts on the mass 
media had been established, later to become the Steering Committee on the 
Mass Media (CDMM), part of the directorate-general on human rights. As the 
Europeanisation of broadcasting continued in the 1980s, the CDMM made 
various recommendations on topics such as advertising (R84-3) and satellite 
communications (R84-22). More broadly, as Komorek has argued, the 
development of Council of Europe media policy has been a two-step process. 
First, the European Court of Human Rights went beyond the strict application 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to become a policy 
actor itself, and then the Council of Europe ‘fill(ed) in the gap’ in the Court’s 
media pluralism jurisprudence.7 As such, the Council was, and continues to 
be, well placed to draft binding legal instruments, based on a long-standing 
policy agenda. 
 
                                       
4
 Frits Hondius, ‘Regulating transfrontier television: the Strasbourg option’ (1988) 8 YB Eur L 
141; Ivo Schwartz, ‘Broadcasting and the EEC Treaty’ (1986) 11 EL Rev 7. 
5
 Jean Chalaby, Transnational television in Europe (IB Tauris 2009) 59. 
6
 This summary is adapted from Kayhan Karaca, Guarding the watchdog - Council of Europe 
and the media (Council of Europe Publishing 2003). 
7
 Ewa Komorek, ‘Is media pluralism a human right? The European Court of Human Rights, 
the Council of Europe and the issue of media pluralism’ [2009] 3 Eur Human Rights L Rev 
395, 396, 408. 
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However, broadcasting was also an issue for the EEC in the 1980s, discussed 
frequently and at length. In particular, the Commission drafted a Directive on 
broadcasting during the 1980s, although the process can be traced further 
back, to the decisions of the ECJ in Sacchi and Debauve.8 The list of 
proposed single market directives (for action following the 1986 Single 
European Act towards the 1992 target) drawn up by DG III (then responsible 
for industry and the single market) included broadcasting as a service, 
although other directorates-general had an interest in the matter, such as DG 
IV (on anti-competitive practices) and DG X (culture: on the impact of the 
import of American programmes).9 The division of responsibility (or interest) 
across directorates-general was to be a regular issue for the development of 
the EU’s approach to the media.10 The definitive statement of the 
Commission’s early approach is found in the 1983 interim report11 and the 
following year’s Green Paper.12 These documents sparked a vigorous debate 
on the form and appropriateness of how law – whether EEC, international, or 
both – would govern broadcasting.  
 
In particular, it has been argued that the UK and other states, recognising the 
Council of Europe’s interest in media from a cultural and freedom of 
expression point of view, 'decided to use the Council’ to draw up an 
alternative instrument that was less of an interference with the activities of 
states than what the Commission was proposing.13 The EBU, representing 
public service broadcasters, was also active on this matter.14 The proposal 
was brought forward at the Vienna Council of Europe Mass Media conference 
of 1986, which called for ‘binding legal instruments’ to be drafted.15 This was 
                                       
8
 Case 155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409 (the nature of a TV signal is that it is the provision of a 
service); Case 52/79 Procureur du roi v Debauve [1980] ECR 833 (member states are limited 
in the restrictions they can place on broadcasts from other states, but this remains possible 
when certain conditions are satisfied as there has been no harmonisation). See also Perry 
Keller, European and International Media Law (OUP 2011) 118-9. 
9
 John Howkins & Michael Foster, Television in 1992: a guide to Europe's new TV, film and 
video business (Coopers & Lybrand 1989) 5; Richard Collins, Audiovisual and broadcasting 
policy in the European Community (University of North London Press 1993) 7 (adding DG 
XIII, telecommunications). 
10
 See for example Alison Harcourt, The European Union and the regulation of media markets 
(Manchester University Press 2005) 71-3; David Levy, Europe's digital revolution: 
broadcasting regulation, the EU and the nation state (Routledge 1999) 41 (on the division 
between ‘deregulatory’ and ‘dirigiste’ approaches mapping to DGs), 51-58 (on the proposed 
media ownership directive). 
11
 European Commission, ‘Realities and tendencies in European television: perspectives and 
options’ COM(83) 229. 
12
 European Commission, ‘Television without frontiers’, COM(84) 300. 
13
 Howkins & Foster (n 9) 57. See also Eva Goerens, ‘Interplay between relevant European 
legal instruments’ in Susanne Nikoltchev (ed), Audiovisual Media Services without frontiers - 
implementing the rules (European Audiovisual Observatory 2006) 2 (on the negative attitude 
to the Commission’s proposals bringing ‘new stimulus’ to Council of Europe work on the 
media at the Vienna conference); Daniel Krebber, Europeanisation of regulatory television 
policy (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2002) 92 (on the objections from state-level governments 
and broadcasters in Germany, based on public service broadcasting and on common interest 
with German-language broadcasters outside the EEC in Austria and Switzerland). 
14
 Rosemary Hughes, ‘Satellite broadcasting: the regulatory issues in Europe’ in Ralph 
Negrine (ed), Satellite broadcasting: the politics and implications of the new media 
(Routledge, 1988) 68. 
15
 Hondius (n 4) 155. 
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not without obstacle, and in the earlier part of the decade, difficulties in 
establishing a common approach to media policy between western European 
states and some in the East were apparent.16 To some extent, the resulting 
Convention was designed to resist a ‘purely market approach’ (which seems 
to implicate the EEC as favouring such), leading to a lowering of standards, 
the erosion of the public service concept and damage to European cultural 
heritage.17 However, it has also been linked, by the Council of Europe itself, to 
the broader role of international law in the regulation of cross-border media 
and the culmination of the Council’s ‘full programme devoted to the media’ 
from 1976 onwards.18 
 
So what of the then-EEC? On the one hand, the Commission argued that a 
services approach did not differ all that much from a human rights one: ‘the 
freedom to provide services within the Community, as manifested in the 
shape of the freedom of broadcasting, has at least the same scope as the 
fundamental European right to a free flow of opinions, information and 
ideas’.19 Voices within the Union, particularly the Parliament, presented 
broadcast regulation ‘largely in terms of the EU’s cultural and political goals’.20 
The Commission itself tried to resist the move to dealing with broadcasting 
through the Council of Europe, even threatening (through Lord Cockfield, 
then-Commissioner for and ‘architect’ of the single market) to take action 
against the UK for violating article 5 of the Treaty of Rome through its 
promotion of a Convention.21  
 
This confrontational approach was eventually to be taken in respect of air 
transport issues at the turn of the century.22 In the case of broadcasting, the 
1989 dispute was resolved (without the formal conflict of the 2009-11 revision, 
discussed below), with it being agreed that the Convention would be 
concluded first, followed shortly by the EEC’s Directive using generally similar 
language.23 The legal basis for the Directive included the freedoms of 
establishment and to provide services – but not culture, which was not 
considered (in a limited fashion and with little impact on subsequent 
                                       
16
 Krebber (n 13) 83. 
17
 Explanatory report to European Convention on Transfrontier Television, ETS 132, 25. 
18
 Hondius (n 4) 149. 
19
 Ivo Schwartz, 'Freedom to provide broadcasting services: legal aspects of trans-frontier 
broadcasting' in Broadcasting Policies in the EEC (European Institute for the Media 1985) 55. 
The author was a director with responsibility for the approximation of laws regarding freedom 
of establishment and to provide services with the European Commission and one of the 
authors of the 1984 Green Paper on the EEC and broadcasting; he also wrote the magisterial 
‘Broadcasting and the EEC Treaty’ (n 4), which considers EU competence in a thorough 
article-by-article fashion; it is only marred by its complete sidelining of the Council of Europe, 
which is mentioned once in passing and in a different context than one might expect. 
20
 Levy (n 10) 41. Cultural goals in this case pertained to Community rather than national 
culture: Rachael Craufurd Smith, ‘Community intervention in the cultural field: continuity or 
change’ in Rachael Craufurd Smith (ed), Culture and European Union law (OUP 2004) 41. 
21
 Howkins & Foster (n 4) 57. Presumably referring to the requirement for states to ‘facilitate 
the achievement of the Community’s aims’ and ‘abstain from any measures likely to 
jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty’. 
22
 Case C-466/98 Commission v UK [2002] ECR I-9427 (‘Open Skies’). 
23
 On these events (at the second Ministerial conference in Stockholm, 1988, and the 
European Council summit in Rhodes, later in 1988, where decisions were reached to proceed 
with two instruments), see Hondius (n 4) 157-9; Klebber (n 13) 106-7. 
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legislation) until the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.24 Despite an argument that the 
debate on the original claim of competence was superficial,25 it is not today 
the subject of much debate.  
 
Although the Convention dealt with more topics than the Directive (such as 
fairness in news), the Directive was – as an instrument of EEC law – the more 
powerful one. It also dealt with a small number of significant matters not 
covered by the Convention, such as a quota for independent production. 
Regarding the relationship between the two instruments, the Convention 
provides in article 27(1) that ‘parties which are members of the European 
Community shall apply Community rules and shall not therefore apply the 
rules arising from this Convention except in so far as there is no Community 
rule governing the particular subject concerned.’ This ‘disconnection clause’26 
means that, for member states of the EU, the purpose of the Convention is to 
govern relations between the state in question and any non-EU states, which 
have ratified it. This became a standard form clause,27 albeit criticised for 
harming the interests of non-EU parties.28 In turn, the Directive contained a 
recital referring to the Convention.29 
 
Consideration of human rights also informed the debate that led to the 1989 
instruments. For example, article 7 of the Convention, dealing with indecency, 
was designed to reflect both article 10(2) ECHR and the provisions of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights regarding dignity and equality 
(contained in its preamble), and to be read in the light of ECHR jurisprudence, 
i.e. Handyside and subsequent cases.30 The provisions of the Directive 
regarding public morality, while influenced by the ECHR, were a new 
development for EEC law, but the Directive would not have been agreed 
without them, given the views of member states.31 Karaca further proposes 
that ‘while the [ECHR] defends freedom of information against violations, the 
[1982 Council declaration on the freedom of expression and information32] 
                                       
24
 On the significance of this for the drafting of the 1989 Directive, see Levy (n 10) 162-3. On 
impact, see Craufurd Smith (n 20) 58. 
25
 Vincenzo Salvatore, 'Quotas on TV programmes and EEC law' (1992) 29 CML Rev 967, 
968. 
26
 Jan Klabbers, Treaty conflict and the European Union (CUP 2009) 220-1 (noting that 
clauses of this nature in Council of Europe instruments date from 1988 onwards and that the 
Commission has defended their use on the grounds that they maintain the primacy and 
integrity of EU law). 
27
 Marise Cremona, ‘Defending the Community interest: the duties of co-operation and 
compliance’ in Marise Cremona & Bruno de Witte (eds), European Union foreign relations 
law: constitutional fundamentals (Hart 2008) 142; Marise Cremona, ‘Disconnection clauses in 
EU law and practice’ in Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos, Mixed agreements revisited 
(Hart 2010) 168-170. 
28
Peter Olson, ‘Mixity from the outside: the perspective of a treaty partner’ in Christophe 
Hillion & Panos Koutrakos, Mixed agreements revisited (Hart 2010) 337 (arguing that they 
reduce legal certainty and are more disruptive than the normal principles of treaty law and 
even declarations of competence). 
29
 Recital 3: ‘The Council of Europe has adopted the European Convention on Transfrontier 
Television’ (now recital 4 in the consolidated 2010 directive). 
30
 Explanatory report (n 17) 117-120. 
31
 Howkins & Foster (n 9) 9. 
32
 Decl-29.04.82E, 29 April 1982. 
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(went) on the offensive and propose(d) ways of developing it’.33 
 
As such, the implications of article 10 ECHR for broadcast regulation, 
particularly when it is ‘positive’ regulation, continued to be debated. It was 
argued prior to the conclusion of the Directive and Convention that restricting 
the nature and quality of content or requiring impartiality or balance cannot be 
justified by general interest because they are not included within the 
permissible exceptions under article 10(2) ECHR.34 It is said that article 10 
should be read as opposing discrimination against broadcasters from outside 
a given state,35 but others see the potential for a positive obligation regarding 
pluralism.36 The ECtHR’s decisions in Informationsverein Lentia37 (where a 
refusal to license was found to violate article 10) and particularly Demuth38 
(where it was not) confirmed the role of the state in guaranteeing media 
pluralism (including through rules on concentration) and the entitlement of the 
public to receive a range of information and ideas. Regulation must be 
prescribed by law and be proportionate but it is not limited to the legitimate 
aims enumerated in article 10(2). 
 
Looking back at the events leading to the 1989 instruments, it is clear that 
issues such as the disconnection clause, the role of human rights, and the 
future relationship between the documents were all left without a complete 
resolution. However, the very fact that two documents were possible, and 
aspects of the Council’s agenda stayed on the table, demonstrates that 
beneficial deliberative competition was in operation, but would be tested in the 
years ahead. I now turn to the implications of amendments to the Directive for 
the Convention. 
 
3. From revision to refusal?  
 
Despite the complex relationship between the drafting of the Directive and the 
Convention, subsequent revisions of the Convention have come in response 
to changes to the Directive. This supports a reading of the Directive as the 
key instrument, or in Krebbers’ alternative framing of the issue, a shift in the 
status of the Convention from an alternative space to an additional space.39 
The first amending protocol to the Convention (1998) reflected 1997 
amendments to the Directive. The Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the 
second series of amendments to the original Directive, extended the 
application of aspects of EU broadcasting law to certain on-demand services, 
while also revising various provisions affecting ‘linear’ television services. 40 It 
                                       
33
 Karaca (n 6) 15. 
34
 Schwartz (n 4) 58-9. 
35
 Martin Seidel, ‘Europe and the media’ (1985) 22 CML Rev 129, 131. 
36
 Komorek (n 7) 406. 
37
 Informationsverein Lentia v Austria (1994) 17 EHRR 93. 
38
 Demuth v Switzerland (2004) 38 EHRR 20. 
39
 Krebbers (n 13) 167. 
40
 See in particular Rachael Craufurd Smith, ‘Media convergence and the regulation of 
audiovisual content: is the European Community’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive fit for 
purpose?' [2007] CLP 238; Miri Burri-Nenova, ‘The new audiovisual media services directive: 
televisions without frontiers, television without cultural diversity’ (2007) 44 CML Rev 1689; 
Caroline Pauwels & Karen Donders, ‘From television without frontiers to the digital big bang: 
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was therefore not surprising that the Standing Committee on Transfrontier 
Television drafted a second amending protocol to the Convention. From the 
Council’s perspective, this was part of a wider agenda for media and Internet 
regulation. At the first of a new series of conferences in Reykjavik in 2009, 
ministers responsible for media and new communication services referred to 
the protocol as ‘a welcome Council of Europe response to the diversification 
of communication platforms and information services’, which should be 
completed at the earliest opportunity. The ministers also noted that it should 
be followed by the exploration of broader legal issues regarding media-like 
content, Internet traffic and access to critical infrastructure.41 However, just as 
the draft second amending protocol was completed and on the verge of 
entering the final stages of discussion and approval prior to opening for 
signature, an objection from the European Commission put the process on 
hold. This objection ultimately led to the abandonment of the protocol, and 
calls into question the future relevance of the Convention as a whole. 
 
The nature of the dispute between the Commission and the Council of Europe 
can be seen in Commission letters and the minutes of Council of Europe 
meetings in the period 2009/10. The key letter is that of 23 October 2009, 
from the Commission to the EU member states, including reference to the 
ultimate sanction of proceedings under then-Article 226 (now article 258 
TFEU).42 The core argument of the letter is set out in the following paragraph. 
 
The matters covered by the Convention fall to a great extent under 
Community competence since the Convention deals broadly with 
matters covered by the [Directive]. Therefore, in accordance with the 
case law of the European Court of Justice, Member States may not 
conclude alone international agreements which cover matters falling 
under Community competence.  
 
The Commission’s argument that states ‘may not conclude alone international 
agreements which cover matters falling under Community competence’ 
appears to classify the issue as one of ‘implied exclusive external 
competence’ rather than ‘implied external competence simpliciter’,43 although 
there is some doubt as to whether this distinction is relevant after the Lisbon 
Treaty.44 It should be emphasised that this is a debate over the ability of a 
state to sign and ratify an international agreement in terms of EU law rather 
                                                                                                             
the EU’s continuous efforts to create a future-proof internal media market’ in Robin Mansell 
and Marc Raboy (eds), Handbook of Global Media and Communication Policy (Blackwell 
2011). 
41
 Political declaration (MCM(2009)011) [6]. 
42
 This letter has not been published, but was obtained by the author from the Commission 
(under Regulation 1049/2011 on access to documents) and from the Department for Culture, 
Media & Sport [DCMS] in the UK (under the Freedom of Information Act). The letter carries 
the reference D(09)1713 and is signed by Commissioner Viviane Reding. 
43
 The distinction between the two is discussed in Christiana Panayi, ‘Exploring the Open 
Skies: EC-Incompatible Treaties between Member States and Third Countries’ (2006) 25 YB 
Eur L 315, 326.  
44
 Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, EU law: text, cases & materials (5
th
 edn, OUP 2011) 81-2. 
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than international law.45 The Commission suggests at the opening of the letter 
that there may be a conflict between the two instruments. It argued 
(elsewhere) that the letter was no more than a restatement of current law.46 
Indeed, the law after Open Skies is well summarised by Klabbers in his 
monograph on treaty conflict and the EU: 'if the Community has taken 
measures internally, the member states are pre-empted from taking external 
measures which may affect those internal measures or distort their scope'.47 
The Commission cites the reference in the Open Skies decision48 to 
disconnection clauses not disturbing the principle that states cannot act alone.  
 
This letter appears to have caused some concern for EU member states. 
Austria raised the matter at the Council of the EU (the Council of Ministers) in 
2009.49 Its statement criticised the Commission for raising the issue now when 
it had not made similar objections to the 1998 amendments to the Convention 
which followed the 1997 amendments to the Directive,50 although the findings 
of the Court of Justice in Open Skies came after the first set of amendments 
had been agreed. Austria also asked for more information on the extent of the 
conflict between the instruments. At the Contact Committee (established 
under the Directive to consider its implementation) some states also criticised 
the Commission for raising its objection at such a late stage. However, the 
Commission denied that the objection was unexpected and emphasised that 
the problem was one of principle regarding the external powers of the Union.51 
 
However, the most vehement criticism of the objection came, unsurprisingly, 
from within the Council of Europe itself. The significance of this problem can 
be best understood through summarising the responses of various bodies 
within the Council. This period begins with the decision of the Committee of 
Ministers to decline to refer the proposed revisions to the Parliamentary 
Assembly for comment.52 This had been its intention before the intervention of 
the Commission. Relevant comments and responses include the following: 
 
 The secretariat (Media & Information Society Division) wrote to 
delegates to pass on the news and to state that it was ‘very 
                                       
45
 Robert Schütze, ‘Federalism and foreign affairs: mixity as an (inter)national phenomenon’ 
in Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos, Mixed agreements revisited (Hart 2010) 77. 
46
 As reported by Sion Simon (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport) in his Written Statement on the November 2009 meeting of the Education, Youth and 
Culture Council. HC Deb 26 November 2009, vol 501 col 88WS. 
47
 Klabbers (n 26) 187. 
48
 Open Skies (n 22). 
49
 Council of the European Union, document 15814/09, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st15/st15814.en09.pdf; Austria’s request, 
forwarded to all members in advance of the meeting, was supported by other states including 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, and Romania. 
50
 Indeed, as recorded in 2006, one state (Luxembourg) was told by the Commission that 
accession to the Convention was possible, on the grounds that it contained a disconnection 
clause: Tarlach McGonagle, ‘Report’ in Susanne Nikoltchev (ed), Audiovisual Media Services 
without frontiers - implementing the rules (European Audiovisual Observatory, 2006) 48-9. 
51
 Minutes of the 31
st
 meeting of the Contact Committee established by the Television Without 
Frontiers Directive (3 November 2009), DOC CC TVSF (2009)6, 3. 
52
 1069
th
 meeting of the Council of Ministers, 4 November 2009. 
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disappointed by this unexpected development’ (November 2009).53  
 The CDMC,54 which is the committee most engaged in debates on 
broadcasting, referred to its ‘deep concern about the interruption of the 
process towards adoption of the amending protocol’ (June 2010).55  
 The CDMC Bureau recorded its ‘regret’ at the Commission’s actions 
(May 2010).56  
 The Standing Committee on Transfrontier Television, responsible for 
drafting the protocol, expressed its ‘deep regret’ at the obstacles to 
concluding its work, adding that it ‘deplored’ the failure of the 
Commission to raise its objections at an earlier stage (July 2010)57  
 Adopting a harder tone than its earlier statement, the CDMC, while 
reiterating its concern and calling for progress to be made, added a 
warning of a possible ‘legal vacuum’ leading to ‘undesirable 
consequences’ if the Convention could not be updated as planned 
(November 2010).58  
 The CDMC Bureau argued that the failure to update the Convention 
meant that the regulation of broadcasting in accordance with Article 10 
ECHR could become difficult (October 2010)59 (the extent to which this 
is the case is discussed in a later section of this paper).  
 Questions put to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) by Andrew McIntosh (author of the PACE report on ‘The 
regulation of audiovisual media services’ in 2008) and, after his death, 
by Markku Laukkanen, criticising the pause in the revision of the 
Convention, and highlighting the existence of conflicts between the 
amended Directive and unamended Convention (March 2010, 
December 2010, June 2011).60  
 
This survey demonstrates the anxiety in the Council about the way the matter 
was handled, but it also discloses an important legal issue about the 
consequences of failing to revise. However, there was to be no revised 
Convention. The end of the debate can be found in two subsequent 
documents: a letter from the Commission to the Council and a statement by 
the Council itself.  
                                       
53
 Email from Secretariat to members of the Standing Committee on Transfrontier Television, 
6 November 2009 (received from DCMS via FOI). 
54
 Originally the CDMM (Steering Committee on the Mass Media), it was at the time of these 
events known as the CDMC (Steering Committee on the media and new communication 
services). Since January 2012, it has been known as the CDMS (Steering Committee on 
Media and Information Society). 
55
 Report of the 12
th
 meeting of the CDMC, 8-11 June 2010. 
56
 Report of the meeting of the Bureau of the CDMC, 6-7 May 2010, CDMC-BU(2010)002, 8. 
57
 45
th
 meeting of the Standing Committee on Transfrontier Television, 1-2 July 2010, T-
TT(2010)2, 2. 
58
 Report of the 13
th
 meeting of the CDMC, 16-19 November 2010. 
59
 Report of the meeting of the Bureau of the CDMC, 14-15 October 2010, CDMC-
BU(2010)004, 9. 
60
 Written question 584 to the Committee of Ministers, 10 March 2010, document 12182; 
Written question 591 to the Committee of Ministers, 15 December 2010, document 12452 
(but note that the Committee did discuss the McIntosh question on 31 March 2010, as the 
information disclosed by DCMS confirms); CM/AS(2011)Quest591 final, adopted at the 1116
th
 
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies of the Committee of Ministers, CM/Del/Dec(2011)1116, 15-
16 June 2011. 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2013/26 
Page 10 of 22 
 
 
 
The letter, dated 10 December 2010, responds to a request from the Council 
for an explanation of the October 2009 letter.61 Commissioner Kroes, who had 
in the meantime taken over from Reding as the Commissioner responsible for 
media, broadly restates the arguments of the 2009 letter, but with some 
additions. For example, Article 3(2) TFEU,62 which was not in force when the 
2009 letter was sent, is cited. One of the consequences of the delay resulting 
from the second letter is the strengthening of the Commission’s case, in so far 
as it is founded on the TFEU. Furthermore, the formal position is stated in 
stronger terms and disconnected from the narrower argument on the text of 
the instruments: ‘for those matters [covered by the Convention], the Union 
thus has acquired exclusive competence to enter into international 
agreements. As a consequence, even if the substance of the Convention 
would not conflict with Union law – which is not the case here – EU Member 
States may not become party to the Convention on their own’. 
 
Most importantly, the Commission records its firm position regarding the 
relationship between the two documents, and its future intentions, in the 
following paragraph. 
 
As the [EU Ambassador] already explained to the Committee of 
Ministers [of the Council of Europe], the EU does not intend to become a 
party to the Convention, as this would constrain the speed and scope of 
any future policy response in the areas covered. Furthermore, the 
Union’s audiovisual acquis is already relevant to almost all Parties to the 
Convention given that the Union has legal relations with almost all 
Convention Signatories, which ensures or will ensure the application of 
the acquis. The added value to the EU of such a convention in terms of 
the wider geographical scope would therefore be rather limited. 
 
Having established that states cannot ratify the amended Convention without 
the agreement of the EU, the Commission now makes it clear that it has no 
intention of offering such agreement. Such agreement, according to the 
Commission, would restrict EU flexibility regarding future changes; the ‘added 
value’ of the Convention is limited, as almost all signatories are subject to the 
Directive whether through EU membership or other legal agreements. The 
                                       
61
 This letter has also not been published, but was obtained by the author from the 
Commission (also under the Regulation on access to documents). The letter carries the 
reference KROES/2010/A/1341 and is signed by Commissioner Neelie Kroes.  
62
 ‘The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international 
agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary 
to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may 
affect common rules or alter their scope’; see also article 216 TFEU: ‘The Union may 
conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or international organisations where 
the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to 
achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the 
Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or 
alter their scope’. It has been suggested that these texts, as well as codifying the decisions of 
the ECJ, slightly extend the exclusive powers of the Union regarding international 
agreements: Jan Wouters, Dominic Coppens & Bart de Meester, ‘External relations after the 
Lisbon Treaty’ in Stefan Griller & Jacques Ziller (eds), The Lisbon Treaty: EU 
constitutionalism without a constitutional treaty? (Springer 2008) 179-180. 
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letter refers to the ‘audiovisual acquis’, which could suggest that the 
Commission means to include other instruments as well as the Directive. 
Furthermore, the reference to legal relations which ‘ensure or will ensure’ its 
application may refer to future enlargement. 
 
Although not included in this letter, the reference to added value may also 
reflect the 2006 view of the Commission that such value would be found in 
scope rather than geography.63 Doubting the value of the Council’s role and 
arguing that the EU can deal with the geographical issue goes back even 
further, though.64 The reasons for the objection were also put forward by the 
representative of the Commission at a meeting of the Standing Committee on 
Transfrontier Television in July 2010, which added details such as that the 
Commission intended to extend the application of the Directive in non-EU 
states through stability and association agreements.65 This might appear to go 
against the conventional reasoning in favour of Council of Europe conventions 
in being preferable to bilateral agreements as they encourage co-operation in 
sensitive areas and point towards greater cohesion,66 although the 
agreements, in the context of the neighbourhood policy, may not be truly 
bilateral but more the extension of Union-led asymmetric multilateralism. 
 
With this in mind, the only thing left for the Council to do was to recognise the 
new position and decide what to do about the Convention. This was brought 
about in the first months of 2011, when the Standing Committee on 
Transfrontier Television noted the decision of the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe to ‘discontinue work on transfrontier television’.67 The 
Committee’s Bureau also responded to these events, noting ‘disquiet’ at the 
decision to discontinue and referred to the ‘current legal uncertainty’ resulting 
from there being different rules in the two instruments.68 This is a reference to 
the Directive having been updated and now fully in force and (mostly) 
transposed, while the Convention is still as it was in 1998.  
                                       
63
 Karol Jakubowicz, ‘Implementing and monitoring: upholding human rights and cultural 
values’ in Susanne Nikoltchev (ed), Audiovisual Media Services without frontiers - 
implementing the rules (European Audiovisual Observatory 2006) 41. Note that Jakubowicz 
was then the chair of the CDMC. 
64
 See for example the report on the 11
th
 Congress of the International Federation for 
European Law (FIDE) in 1985, where the representatives of the Commission ‘pointed out that 
the activities in the framework of the CoE were useful but could not serve as a substitute for 
Community action in the field of radio and TV. The Recommendations and Resolutions of the 
Council of Europe have no binding force. In addition, the existing Recommendations do not 
cover all aspects [...] close co-operation with those European countries which do not belong 
to the Community is, of course, desirable and can be easily established’ (reproduced in 
Seidel (n 35) 134). 
65
 45
th
 meeting of the Standing Committee on Transfrontier Television, 1-2 July 2010, T-
TT(2010)2, 1-2. The ratification of the Convention is frequently pointed to when progress 
towards EU law in the field of media is being assessed: see for example the Opinions on the 
application for membership by Montenegro (SEC(2010) 1334) and Croatia (COM(2004) 257), 
the Neighbourhood Policy progress reports on Azerbaijan (SEC(2010) 519) and Georgia 
(SEC(2010) 518), and the discussion of Serbia in the Enlargement Strategy (COM(2009) 
533).  
66
 Benoit-Rohmer and Klebes (n 3) 85. 
67
 Note dated 4 February 2011 published on the T-TT website, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/T-TT/default_en.asp.  
68
 Report of the meeting of the Bureau of the CDMC, 9-11 May 2011, CDMC-BU(2011)002, 3. 
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Given that one of the purposes of the revision to the Directive was to clarify its 
scope for non-linear services, this is not an insignificant point. However, in 
practice, the unamended Convention may itself be limited in its force, as of 
the non-EU states that are party to the Convention, a majority are candidate 
states (e.g. Macedonia) or wish to join the Union in due course (e.g. Albania), 
and may be the subject of bilateral or informal arrangements with the Union in 
the interim, such as those discussed above. An exception may be Ukraine, as 
the only ‘large’ state party to the Convention without a current or likely link 
with the EU. It can therefore be concluded that the Council’s role in relation to 
the matters included in the Convention is marginal at best, and the EU faces 
little challenge in leading the debate on the next steps in broadcast regulation. 
In the next section, the reasons for this conclusion are further explored, and 
the trajectory of cooperation and competition between the Union and Council 
explained. 
 
4. Analysis 1: the European Commission 
 
It is notable that although many parties are critical of the timing and tone of 
the Commission intervention, few if any present an alternative view of the 
legal question of competence. In this regard the question of broadcasting has 
come to resemble other areas of activity where the EU’s role has become a 
fait accompli.69 Reflecting on the ending of bilateral air agreements, Bartlik 
pointed out that because air transportation is now regulated within the EU by 
the (then-)Community, ‘it is therefore only about time that this reality is also 
recognised on the international stage and that the Community is attributed a 
corresponding significance and possibility of participation’.70 Another scholar 
describes the series of decisions by the ECJ as a trend towards ‘shared 
competences’ for external affairs.71 The Commission’s successful intervention 
regarding the Convention can be seen as a claim for recognition, significance 
and participation along these lines. Indeed, a statement that international law 
is being Europeanised as a result of a ‘triangular relationship’ between 
international, EU and national law72 does describe the tension very well, albeit 
with the end result leaving some doubt on whether international law (through 
the Council of Europe) will have any role at all. On the other hand, there are 
situations where the dispute between the Commission and member states 
(through the Council) is more closely balanced; the Commission has 
commenced legal action against the Council, arguing against the Council’s 
shared-competence approach to a proposed Council of Europe instrument on 
intellectual property rights in broadcast signals,73 as it has regarding 
conditional access (discussed below). 
                                       
69
 But more generally, the role of international agreements remains difficult and frequently 
litigated: Editorial, ‘The Union, the Member States and international agreements’ (2011) 48 
CML Rev 1. 
70
 Martin Bartlik, The impact of EU law on the regulation of international air transportation 
(Ashgate 2007) 42. 
71
 Christiaan Timmermans, ‘Evolution of mixity since the Leiden 1982 conference’ in 
Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos, Mixed agreements revisited (Hart 2010) 2-3. 
72
 Jan Wouters, André Nollkaemper & Erika de Wet, ‘Introduction’ in Jan Wouters, André 
Nollkaemper & Erika de Wet (eds), The Europeanisation of international law (Asser 2008). 
73
 Case C-114/12 Commission v Council. The case has not yet been heard. 
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de Witte has pointed to how EU member states cannot conclude treaties in 
areas such as trade in goods, adding that the ill-defined ability of the EU to act 
without the separate approval of the member states when a given agreement 
is ‘closely related to a previously adopted internal act’ is problematic.74 The 
situation of broadcasting is slightly different. The EU is making a claim 
regarding external powers but then proposing not to use them and to prevent 
them from being used by anyone else. Neither is this truly a conflict between a 
prior obligation of a member state and a subsequent obligation of Union 
membership,75 as the dispute arises out of an attempt to amend an existing 
instrument (i.e. a proposed new obligation).76 Finally, for the EU to ratify a 
convention on broadcasting in its own right, article 207(6) TFEU could well 
require internal unanimity. This Treaty provision requires unanimity (as a 
departure from the general approach to external agreements and the common 
commercial policy) ‘in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, 
where these agreements risk prejudicing the Union’s cultural and linguistic 
diversity’. In the light of the difficult adoption and revision of the Directive itself, 
this may surely not be secured without effort. 
 
In the case of the Convention and the Directive, it was observed that the 
‘tendency among regulators to accord to some of the provisions of the 
Convention the meaning of their counterpart in the Directive, and vice versa, 
may have helped to avoid conflicts'77 between the two instruments.78 The 
disconnection clause acknowledges the possibility of divergence and ensures, 
with the Union, that the Directive prevails.79 There have been some cases 
where the distance between the two instruments has in fact been 
emphasised. In Commission v UK, the UK had argued it would be ‘absurd’ to 
depart from the Convention (regarding jurisdiction), but the Commission 
contended that the Directive and Convention pursued different aims – internal 
market and facilitating transfrontier television respectively.80 The court 
                                       
74
 Erika de Witte, ‘The emergence of a European system of public international law: the EU 
and its member states as strange subjects’ in Jan Wouters, André Nollkaemper & Erika de 
Wet (eds), The Europeanisation of international law (Asser 2008) 41 
75
 Reflecting the principle of pacta sunt servanda; in the context of EU law, see Case 812/79 
AG v Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, as discussed in Julie Grimes, ‘Conflicts between EC law and 
international treaty obligations: a case study of the German telecommunications dispute’ 
(1994) 35 Harvard J Intl L 535; see also Klabbers (n 26) 127-8.  
76
 A revision of a treaty will normally be treated as a new treaty, meaning that the provision 
will not be applicable: see Case 34/79 R v Henn & Darby [1979] ECR 3795; Open Skies (n 
22) [25]-[29]. 
77
 Goerens (n 13) 3. 
78
 Case C-89/04 Mediakabel [2005] ECR I-4891 [41] (on the definition of television in the 
context of near-video-on-demand); Case C-245/01 RTL [2003] ECR I-12489 [63] (advertising 
during films); Case C-11/95 Commission v Belgium [1996] ECR I-4115 [24] (on the inclusion 
of cable transmission within the scope of the Directive). Furthermore, see the Opinion of AG 
Jacobs in Case C-34/95 De Agostini [1997] ECR I-3843 [74], finding that the specific 
reference to consumer protection and advertising in the Convention but not in the Directive is 
a recognition of the lack of separate legal provision for advertising in the Council (but not the 
EU) rather than a deliberate exclusion of this matter from the Directive.  
79
 Cremona (n 27) 176. 
80
 Case C-222/94 Commission v UK [1996] ECR I-4025 [43-50]. See also AG Jacobs in Case 
C-34/95 De Agostini [1997] ECR I-3843 [46] on article 16 of the Convention for another 
example of deliberate difference, again explained by reference to the internal market. 
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adopted the Commission’s view and noted that the Directive was, on this 
point, deliberately different to the Convention.81 On the other hand, the most 
recent broadcasting decision of the Court of Justice (on incitement to hatred) 
includes an important reference to the Convention in the Opinion of AG Bot.82 
This recent decision, in the tradition of the human rights influence discussed 
in section 2 (above), is a further example of beneficial deliberative competition 
in the field of broadcasting. 
 
However, it remains possible for the EU to accede to Council of Europe 
treaties (although this is still relatively rare),83 and Council of Europe 
conventions have continued to influence EU law in areas such as data 
protection and terrorism.84 Perhaps as a partial explanation, it can be noted 
that data protection and terrorism are matters where the competence of the 
Union was established closer to the present day or remains the subject of 
debate. However, this is not an entirely satisfactory explanation for the special 
status of broadcasting. Data protection saw both diverging practice across EU 
member states before adoption of a directive in 199585 (initially on the basis of 
internal market harmonisation rather than fundamental rights), and the 
adoption of an early (1981) Council of Europe instrument.86 These features 
might suggest a similarly strong role for the Council of Europe. The difference 
is that, in the case of data protection, the Commission is participating (‘on 
behalf of the EU’) in the revision of the Council of Europe convention,87 as a 
follow-up step to its publication of a proposed Regulation on data protection.88 
A clue comes from the final sentence of the Commission statement on this 
matter; ‘the negotiation is an opportunity to export the EU's gold standard of 
data protection beyond the borders of the Member States.’  
 
Indeed, this approach of seeing the Council of Europe as a vehicle for the 
extension of the application of EU law89 can also be observed in cases where 
the Council of Europe has not yet adopted an instrument. In particular, the EU 
                                       
81
 It should be noted that the Convention was subsequently amended and this particular 
conflict no longer exists. 
82
 Joined Cases C-244/10 Mesopotamia Broadcast and C-245/10 Roj TV [2012] 1 CMLR 32 
[74], where, interpreting article 22a of the Directive (now article 6) on incitement to hatred, he 
refers to article 7 of the Convention (‘racial hatred’) and its explanatory report; the latter in 
turn refers to a Council of Europe recommendation (R(97) 20) which gives a broad definition 
of hate speech. 
83
 Benoit-Rohmer & Klebes listed nine: (n 3) 129. 
84
 Ibid 130. 
85
 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31. 
86
 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data, ETS 108 (1981). 
87
 European Commission, ‘Commission to renegotiate Council of Europe Data Protection 
Convention on behalf of EU’ MEMO/12/877 (19 November 2012). 
88
 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data’ 
COM(2012) 11. 
89
 On the many ways in which the EU can achieve its goals through international 
organisations, see Bruno de Witte, ‘The European Union’s domestic affairs’ in Enzo 
Cannizzaro, Paulo Palchetti and Ramses Wessel, International law as law of the European 
Union (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 151-4. 
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has been seen to ask the Council of Europe to prepare conventions in areas 
that have already been the subject of a directive. An example is the regulation 
of information society services, where the provisions of the Electronic 
Commerce Directive90 are supported by a subsequent Council of Europe 
Convention.91  
 
In an area closely related to broadcasting, a further type of Union-Council 
interaction can be observed. This is the Conditional Access Convention,92 
which is itself based on the Conditional Access Directive.93 Like the 
Transfrontier Television Convention and the Audiovisual Media Service 
Directive, the language of the two conditional access instruments is closely 
aligned, although in this case the directive came a number of years before the 
corresponding convention. The Conditional Access Convention also contains 
a disconnection clause in the exact same terms as the ECTT. Instead of 
frustrating its continued operation, though, the Commission recommended94 
that the EU itself sign the Conditional Access Convention, using Article 207(4) 
TFEU on international agreements within the scope of the common 
commercial policy. The Council of the EU agreed that the Union should sign 
the convention, but on the basis of articles 114 (internal market) and 218(5) 
(international agreements in general) TFEU.95 The Commission has taken 
legal action against the Council of the EU’s decision and in support of its 
original recommendation.96 In this situation, there is agreement that the 
Council of Europe instrument should continue to function, but with a dispute 
about  the correct legal basis. Regarding broadcasting, the dispute on legal 
basis is supplemented by division within the Council of the EU, and above all 
by the Commission’s view that the Council of Europe has no role to play. 
 
So, how does this dispute regarding broadcasting sit within wider issues of 
Council-Union relations? To answer this question, we can turn to a distinction 
(made by Brosig in a general review of relations between the Council, the 
Union, and the OSCE) between (a) cooperation, (b) division of labour and (c) 
competition.97 This section classifies the approach to broadcasting over time, 
                                       
90
 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market [2000] OJ L178/1. 
91
 Convention on Information and Legal Co-operation concerning “Information Society 
Services”, ETS 180 (2001). The Convention is focused on the sharing of information 
regarding national regulations in this field. 
92 European Convention on the Legal Protection of Services based on, or consisting of, 
Conditional Access, ETS 178 (2001). 
93
 Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 1998 on 
the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access [1998] OJ 
L320/54. 
94
 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the signing of the 
European Convention on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, 
conditional access’ COM(2010) 753. 
95
 Council Decision of 29 November 2011 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the 
European Convention on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, 
conditional access [2011] OJ L336. 
96
 Case C-137/12 Commission v Council [2012] OJ C151. The case has not yet been heard. 
97
 Malte Brosig, ‘Governance between international institutions: analysing interaction modes 
between the EU, the Council of Europe and the OSCE’ in David Galbreath and Carmen 
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using Brosig’s high-level categories. Brosig’s analysis was addressed to a 
general audience and did not include a discussion of the subject of 
broadcasting, but using his analysis contributes to the goal of this article of 
understanding the institutional context for the dispute as well as the issues 
unique to broadcasting. 
 
Cooperation98 
 
It is not difficult to conclude that the regulation of the media has been, for a 
significant period of time, a core field for the Council of Europe, particularly if 
we understand it as a sub-field of freedom of expression, as the Council often 
does. Other reflections on the media, such as the relationship between the 
media and democracy, also favour this interpretation. Moreover, given the 
absence of substantial EU intervention in the field of broadcasting until after 
the Single European Act, and the ongoing absence of a clearly defined EU 
role as regards the press, pluralism and indeed the ‘mix’ of funding models in 
member states,99 broadcasting could have been considered as relatively 
peripheral for the Union at some stage in the past. This was in the context 
where the EEC was happy to focus on economic integration while ‘cultural 
issues would be left to other international organizations with an explicitly 
cultural remit, notably UNESCO and the Council of Europe’,100 with the EEC 
beginning to play a role that was complementary and subsidiary.101 
 
Division of labour102 
 
This describes accurately the state of relations during the lifetime of the 
Convention and Directive. After the compromises of the late 1980s, both 
institutions continued to pay attention to the media and the 1997/98 
amendments were made without inordinate delay or difficulty. Links between 
the two demonstrate some attempts to allow the work of one to inform the 
other (e.g. in the case of developing problems in advertising),103 and the 
parallel dialogue between the institutions on the question of media pluralism 
similarly suggests that both bodies shared the topic of media in this fashion. 
There were opportunities for EU member states to consider media matters 
without the limitations of EU competence.104 Finally, the suggestions 
                                                                                                             
Gebhard (eds), Cooperation or conflict?: problematizing organizational overlap in Europe 
(Ashgate 2010) 37. 
98
 ‘when institutions overlap outside their core fields of competence or if they at least overlap 
in a peripheral area in one organisation and a core area in another’ 
99
 See discussion of different Western European models of the media such as liberal and 
democratic corporatist in Daniel Hallin & Paulo Mancini, Comparing media systems: three 
models of media and politics (CUP 2004). 
100
 Rachael Craufurd Smith, ‘Introduction’ in Rachael Craufurd Smith (ed), Culture and 
European Union law (OUP 2004) 2. 
101
 Joseph McMahon, ‘Preserving and promoting differences? The external dimension of 
cultural cooperation’ in Rachael Craufurd Smith (ed), Culture and European Union law (OUP 
2004) 328. 
102
 ‘if international institutions overlap in their core competence fields’ 
103
 European Commission, ‘Interpretative communication on certain aspects of the provisions 
on televised advertising in the "Television without frontiers" Directive’ [2004] OJ C102/02. 
104
 Richard Collins, From satellite to single market: new communication technology and 
European public service television (Routledge 1998) 235. 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2013/26 
Page 17 of 22 
 
 
emanating from the Commission regarding the future of the Convention (as 
discussed above) might suggest a way to understand the current position as a 
division of labour, were it not for the wider rivalry discussed under the next 
heading. 
 
Competition between organisations105 
 
This may be the most appropriate description of the current relationship 
between the Council and the Union regarding the media. While it is presently 
difficult to describe the Council’s role as peripheral (because even if the 
Convention is put to one side, there is a large body of work underway on other 
media topics), the first concept of ‘significant overlap’ has been demonstrated 
by the exchanges between the Commission and the Council discussed in this 
article. In particular, the difficulty experienced by various parties in articulating 
the areas that are not within the competences of the Union illustrates the 
value of considering the media (or perhaps broadcasting) as the field rather 
than a subset of media issues. Furthermore, it is hard to argue with the 
characterisation of the law on services (in respect of the Union) and on 
freedom of expression (in respect of the Council) as core competence fields of 
each respectively. With it being difficult to work on one without a 
demonstrable impact on the other, Brosig’s third category sums up the 
problems of European broadcasting regulation at this point in time. Beneficial 
deliberative competition has been damaged by the events of the past five 
years. 
 
5. Analysis 2: the response in the UK 
 
In this section, the reaction of one state (the UK) to the revision process is 
scrutinised, so as to verify and extend the analysis in section 4 (above) on the 
relations between the European institutions, and to highlight how states 
handle the tensions between their desired policy objectives and their reading 
of legal powers. It will be shown how the tactical use of the Council for 
substantive reasons in the 1980s has been replaced by the tactical 
abandonment of the forum for other substantive reasons in more recent 
debates. 
 
The UK was, as has been noted, an early supporter of the Convention. Even 
after both instruments were adopted, it continued to favour the Convention, 
including the use of its text in preference to that of the Directive.106 It was an 
active party during the negotiation of the amending protocol, and raised 
concerns in relation to a number of clauses (articles 29 and 33). The first was 
resolved to the apparent satisfaction of the UK, but the second was the 
subject of sustained criticism voiced by the UK through various channels. The 
problem with article 29 (which deals with the reception of on-demand 
services) appeared to be the attempt of the Secretariat to draft the Convention 
clause with more explicit ECHR language than before. As compared with the 
                                       
105
 ‘if there is significant overlap in core competence fields or if one core area of one 
organisation threatens to dominate a peripheral policy area of another organisation’ 
106
 Frere Cholmeley Bischoff, Audio and audio-visual industries in the European Community: 
recent developments (Frere Cholmeley Bischoff, 1993) 5. 
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text taken from the Directive, one proposal would have referred to the 
limitations of article 10 ECHR without more, while another would have used 
much of the text of article 10(2). Correspondence between the Department for 
Culture, Media & Sports [‘DCMS’] and the Ministry of Justice highlights the 
UK’s fear that this language might narrow the scope for State derogation from 
the general principle of freedom of reception, pointing out that under 
international law, there is no general objection to blocking the reception of on-
demand services.107 Separately, the UK responded to the McIntosh report on 
this point,108 disagreeing with McIntosh’s objection to the wider scope for 
restriction under article 29 on the grounds that it would be difficult to apply 
different tests if the Convention and Directive were not aligned.109 Ultimately, 
the language adopted for article 29 was as originally proposed (i.e. in line with 
the Directive), although the record is not clear on how this decision was 
reached. It is interesting to note that the objection here (that the Convention 
might prevent states from blocking objectionable content) is at cross-purposes 
to the defence of the country of origin principle that characterises the 
approach of the UK to the harmonisation of broadcasting law, including its 
concerns regarding article 33 of the Convention, to which I now turn. 
 
The objection of the UK to article 33 was that it would, as the DCMS told MPs 
mean the 'effective jettisoning of the country of origin principle'.110 Article 33 of 
the draft Convention is based on article 4 of the revised Directive, which 
established (in the light of Court of Justice decisions)111 a new procedure that 
offers some scope to ‘receiving’ states to take action against broadcasters. 
This procedure applies to television broadcasting, where a broadcast under 
the jurisdiction of one state is ‘wholly or mostly directed’ at the territory of 
another, and where the latter (receiving) state has adopted ‘rules of general 
public interest’ beyond the Directive. 
 
The UK argued that the language was appropriate in the case of the Directive, 
where it acted in a context of strong dispute resolution and enforcement 
powers held by the Commission and a substantial body of relevant law.112 It 
was not so in the case of the Convention, where the Standing Committee 
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lacked the necessary powers.113 DCMS raised this issue in direct 
correspondence with the Satellite and Cable Broadcasters Group (SCBG)114 
and the consultation document on the revision of the Convention described 
the issue in sceptical detail.115 At the meeting of the Standing Committee on 
Transfrontier Television where discussion of the revisions was completed, the 
UK agreed with all clauses apart from this one.116 This is an interesting 
demonstration of the difficulties with parallel texts, as while the partial 
abrogation of country of origin in the 2007 amendments to the Directive could 
be tolerated by its supporters (because the abrogation was in turn constrained 
by the institutional and legal role of the Commission and Court of Justice), the 
same text proved difficult in the Council of Europe, which does not have the 
same mechanisms to limit member state action. It is therefore not the text that 
causes the problem, but how it operates within a given institutional context. 
 
With this in mind, the overall attitude of the UK to the Convention can be 
scrutinised. It appears that the UK accepted, on legal advice, the view of the 
Commission regarding the external powers of the Union.117 Nonetheless, the 
action of the Commission in raising the issue at a late stage was variously 
described as ‘curious’118 and ‘surprising’.119 However, this was to be to the 
advantage of the UK. In the light of its objections to the content of the 
proposed revision, it did not object to the revision process coming to an end120 
and the Commission intervention was therefore ‘not unwelcome’.121 This is 
particularly significant as, before this intervention, there is no sign that the UK 
had confirmed its view on whether to ratify the Convention or not, but it did 
appear to recognise its marginal position regarding article 33, with other 
supporters of country of origin not seeing a problem with the text.122 Indeed, a 
DCMS document written after the final decision of the Transfrontier Television 
committee but before the Reding letter focuses on the need to make a 
decision on ratification after consultation with stakeholders, without even 
alluding to any issue of competence.123 The new vigour with which the 
Commission pursued its objection to the Council of Europe’s role therefore 
proved to be of unexpected assistance to the UK in resisting an unwelcome 
clause, and the Convention was left without one of its most vocal advocates. 
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6. Conclusion: where next for the Council of Europe? 
 
The purpose of this article was to establish why the disagreement between 
the institutions came about, and the implications of that disagreement.  A 
number of answers to the first question have been proposed: the additional 
powers of the Union under the Lisbon Treaty, the lack of EU member state 
support for the Convention, and the lack of ‘value’ of the Convention to the 
EU.  One cannot help thinking that the issue has not been handled well – a 
full revision brought to the brink of adoption, and a range of legal and political 
issues presented at the last minute. It has been suggested that the timing of 
the entry into force of Lisbon was relevant, as was the unusual tactical 
approach of the UK.   
 
In order to answer the second question, a number of possible ‘next steps’ are 
now considered, drawing upon the detailed analysis of recent events set out 
above.  These options are (a) EU ratification of the Convention and (b) the 
drafting of a new media instrument by the Council. 
 
It has been demonstrated that a significant ‘roadblock’ to the updating of the 
Convention has been reached. It would be simple to conclude, on the basis of 
the analysis in part 4 in particular, that the solution would be for the EU to 
negotiate and ratify the Convention. However, although compelling in some 
fields, it is hard to see it being a realistic one as regards broadcasting. As 
argued above, the EU continues to support comparable instruments like the 
Conditional Access Convention. In such cases, it sees the Council as a useful 
way to promote its already-agreed policies and legislative texts. Wider 
adoption of the provisions on conditional access would be in the interests of 
the Union (as an anti-infringement measure which could reduce troubling 
imports from non-Union states), particularly where the text remains closely 
aligned. The same would be the case for data protection, where one of the 
key achievements of the existing directive is to project EU standards beyond 
EU borders.  
 
Cultural concerns in relation to the regulation of media content may be much 
more pressing than what would seem to some a more technical issue of 
conditional access, which does not divide the ‘industry’ in the way that other 
aspects of media policy clearly do (although the proposed data protection 
regulation does enter riskier territory, particularly in terms of its interaction with 
freedom of expression). Furthermore, in the case of broadcasting, the 
Commission is on record (as discussed above) as opposing the Council’s role 
on grounds such as preserving Union flexibility in terms of future 
amendments. Why, then, would it validate the very role it disavows? It is also 
clear that the Council is not going to pursue the point in the face of the 
exclusive-external case of the Commission, as compared with its more 
assertive approach in respect of the proposed intellectual property instrument. 
 
As such, the second possible outcome must also be considered: for the 
Council to address other areas of media law and policy. There is evidence of 
this happening; for example, in the emerging area of internet governance, the 
Council is playing a visible role, preparing a set of principles and intervening 
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in debates such as domain name management and net neutrality. 
Furthermore, in the case of pluralism, it is well known that the Council has 
argued in favour of media pluralism over an extended period124 (even when 
the EU has showed less of an ability to deal with the topic).125  
 
What could a future Council of Europe instrument deal with? Clues are found 
in the documentation relating to the abandonment of the Convention. 
Regarding the possible scope of such an instrument, a note to the UK 
government on discussion at EU level suggested that this might be an 
instrument dealing with ‘the values of public service broadcasting, unbiased 
news, etc’.126 Another statement by the Commission considered the possibility 
of a convention on non-EU issues or ‘a convention in association with the EU 
to consolidate case law on article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights in the context of audiovisual media services’.127 The need for the latter 
was the subject of particular doubts expressed by members of the Standing 
Committee on Transfrontier Television,128 and the chair of the CDMC (writing 
before the emergence of the competence issue) recorded that the option of a 
new convention had already been considered and rejected in 2004 among 
some controversy.129 However, Komorek has observed that a Council 
instrument on pluralism could increase the possibility of an EU instrument 
being agreed in due course,130 although the close relationship between the 
regulation of ownership (which would be difficult for the Council to tackle) and 
the principle of pluralism would be a formidable obstacle. 
 
The possibility of a separate Council instrument on non-EU matters therefore 
remains alive, but even if such an instrument is agreed, how significant will it 
be? What of the authority of the Council in the area of media policy when it 
has been sidelined so unequivocally regarding the key contemporary issue of 
regulation of television and of on-demand services? Just as the original 
adoption of the Convention was influenced by the desire of the UK and other 
states to see broadcasting dealt with outside the EEC, its abandonment 
reflects the Commission’s lack of interest in using the Council of Europe in the 
way it does in other fields.  Furthermore, dispute over substantive issues lead 
supporters like the UK to adopt an uncharacteristic degree of deference to the 
primacy of the European Union. Did the Council overreach in carrying over 
the new provisions on receiving states, to the extent that it alienated possible 
supporters? The UK and the Commission pursued different goals, in the 
1980s and today, but the unifying theme is the instrumental (or even 
opportunistic) use of the Council process by both the EU and its member 
states. 
 
The revised Directive is argued to be as important as the original was, 
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‘usher(ing) in a new regulatory era’.131 Yet looking at the Council’s role, 
including through Article 10, its wider work on cultural policy and its 
persuasive (albeit yet unsuccessful) attention to media pluralism, its absence 
from the field would be regrettable. The benefits of the Convention to the 
development of EU audiovisual law and policy have been outlined in this 
article. The ‘new regulatory era’ risks being a poorer, less deliberative one. 
The unexpected nature of the Commission’s apparent change of heart also 
demands that attention to the long-term Union/Council relationship be 
considered in other fields, even if there is apparent unity of purpose for the 
time being. 
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